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RULES FOR PATENTS

MICHAEL J. BURSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
There is widespread agreement that the patent system in the
United States is in need of reform. Most of the proposals for patent
reform that have proliferated in recent years share two common
assumptions: first, that patent policy is best made through case-bycase adjudication of the validity of individual patents; and, second,
that the existing allocation of authority over patent policy, in which
the courts are primarily responsible for interpreting and applying
the broad language of the Patent Act, ought not to be disturbed. This
Article challenges both assumptions. I approach the problem of patent reform primarily as a problem of sound administration rather
than innovation policy and argue that Congress should grant the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) substantive rule-making
authority.
The administrative structure of the patent system has been largely
unchanged since 1836. But the administrative tasks that a wellperforming patent system must carry out have changed markedly
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and discussions. Rachel Sachs and James Dorer provided outstanding research assistance.
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since that time. Most importantly, technology in the early- to midnineteenth century was relatively uniform. Today, by contrast, the
process of innovation varies widely among different technologies and
different industries. If the patent system is to meet its goal of
providing incentives for innovation, it must self-consciously tailor the
elements of patentability—both rules and standards—to those
diverse circumstances.
Optimal patent policymaking requires forward-looking deliberation and cost-benefit analysis based on technological and economic
expertise; clarity and predictability so that entities making investment choices based on the property-like aspects of patents can be
confident in the legal regime governing those rights; and transparency and accountability to ensure that the public interest—which is
often distinct from the interests of patent holders—is taken into
account. Unlike courts, agencies acting through rulemaking can
gather and expertly analyze all of the relevant information to make
express policy judgments based on costs and benefits, can decide
issues prospectively and avoid piecemeal decision making, and can
systematically engage the public in the policy-making process.
Although agencies are subject to certain well-understood institutional pathologies, such as capture by powerful interests, on balance
they are more likely to make effective patent policy than courts.
Granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority would
require significant changes to the structure and function of that
agency, and to the role of the courts. The PTO would require the addition of a policy-making capacity separate but capable of drawing
insights from the examination process. The courts in turn would play
a constructive secondary role by surfacing issues that require attention in the interstices of agency rules and engaging in judicial review
of those rules under traditional standards of administrative law.
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INTRODUCTION
There is widespread agreement that the patent system in the
United States is broken. A flood of critical commentary argues that
the system is in “crisis,”1 or that it is a “failure.”2 At the foundation
of these complaints is a belief that the system established in order
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”3 no longer
provides the optimal incentives for innovation.4 A patent provides
an incentive to invest in costly invention—or, more controversially,
to develop or commercialize an invention5—by providing the inventor with a mechanism by which she may potentially recoup her
investment in producing otherwise freely appropriable knowledge.6
The standards for granting a patent are critical to ensuring that this
incentive works. If patents are too few or too narrow, they do not
provide sufficient protection for costly research and development

1. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 1 (2009). Robert Merges leveled this charge against the patent system as early as
1999. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 591
(1999).
2. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1-2 (2008).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. In this Article, I assume that the goal of patent law is to provide incentives for
innovation, according to the standard utilitarian account. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-333
(2003). In that account, patents offer an incentive to engage in costly research and
development because the fruits of that investment, which would otherwise be appropriable
by the general public, are protected by a property right. See id. The patent system is open to
critique from other perspectives that I do not address here. See generally William Fisher,
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
PROPERTY (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001).
5. There is a significant debate among patent scholars over whether patent policy should
be justified solely by virtue of patents’ ex ante incentives to invent or, once the initial
inventive step has been taken, by patents’ ex post effects on the process of development and
commercialization. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004). In a related work, I take a skeptical approach
to certain ex post justifications for patents. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information
Without Intellectual Property (May 27, 2010) (working paper). My argument here, however,
is agnostic regarding this debate; the institutional reforms I propose will result in better
policymaking directed toward either goal.
6. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 13, 294.
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(R&D). If they are too numerous or too broad, they may over protect,
inhibiting access to critical inputs by downstream inventors.7
The standards of patentability are defined by statute. Patents
may issue for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter”8 that is not “obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art”9
and that is described “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use the
same.”10 Like any broadly written statute, the Patent Act requires
interpretation to have any concrete meaning. Indeed, the patent
statute requires policymaking to fill in the gaps that Congress left
through its choice of broad terms.11 That task has been delegated
largely to the courts.12 This Article argues that assigning the
primary responsibility for articulating patent policy to the courts is
suboptimal. Instead, Congress should grant the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) the authority to make substantive rules
implementing the Patent Act.
Most critics of the patent system make two assertions, either
explicitly or implicitly, about the institutional structure of the
patent system: first, that patent policy is best made through caseby-case adjudication of the validity of individual patents; and,
second, that the existing allocation of authority over the standards
for determining patent validity—in which the courts are primarily
responsible for interpreting the broad language of the Patent Act
—ought not to be disturbed. This Article challenges both contentions.
7. For an overview of the access-incentive tradeoff, see, for example, Tim Wu, Intellectual
Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 131-34 (2006).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
9. Id. § 103(a).
10. Id. § 112 para. 1.
11. The claim that the Patent Act, like the Sherman Act, creates space for express policy
choices is not controversial. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law
of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (“[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is
a common law enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the interstices or to
create doctrine emanating solely from Article III’s province.”) (footnote omitted); Arti K. Rai,
Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2003) (“[T]he history of the patent statute as well as its language
strongly suggest that Congress has delegated policy-making responsibility in patent law to
the judiciary.”).
12. See Rai, supra note 11, at 1041.
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Most critics generally approach patent reform through the lens of
innovation policy. They ask what the standards of patentability
ought to be. I ask instead how the standards of patentability ought
to be determined. My central claim is that our current institutional
structure fails to produce optimal policy outcomes and should be
reformed. Consider one recent example that illustrates the dysfunctional nature of patent policymaking: In 1982, the PTO issued the
first patent on a human gene.13 Almost thirty years later, a district
court held that human genes were not patentable subject matter.14
Human genes, in the court’s view, were not a patentable “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” to which the
Patent Act applied.15 In the time between the issuance of the first
gene patent and the district court’s decision, many issues surrounding the validity of patents on genes or DNA were litigated, including
whether certain types of DNA molecules were sufficiently useful
for patent protection,16 whether a patentee seeking to patent DNA
must disclose the entire genetic sequence he seeks to patent,17 and
whether isolated DNA sequences were “obvious” and therefore
unpatentable.18 Yet the fundamental question whether patents on
human genes even constitute eligible subject matter was left unaddressed.19 In the meantime, thousands of patents issued for DNA
13. The first patents on human genetic material were issued in 1982. See
Adrenocorticotropin-lipotropin Precursor Gene, U.S. Patent No. 4,322,499 (filed Dec. 22, 1978)
(issued Mar. 30, 1982). It is believed that the PTO issued the first patents claiming “isolated
DNA,” the kind of stand-alone genes at issue in Association for Molecular Pathology, in the
late 1980s. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
4-5, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2010).
14. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227-32 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). The court did not address the validity of the patents cited supra note 13, but rather a
set of patents for the human genes encoding proteins linked with breast cancer. See id. at 18485.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 101; see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220-32.
16. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
17. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
18. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 155960 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
19. See Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although we have upheld the validity of several
gene patents, none of our cases directly addresses the question of whether such patents
encompass patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.... [T]hus far the question has
evaded judicial review.”).
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sequences.20 An entire industry based on recombinant DNA
technology grew up with the understanding that patents on DNA
sequences were valid. The district court’s decision cast the settled
expectations of many in the biotechnology industry into doubt and
threatened widespread chaos.21
This story illustrates at least two ways in which the system fails.
The first concerns the substance of the court’s analysis. The Patent
Act does not answer directly the question whether human genes
constitute patentable subject matter.22 In the absence of legislative
guidance, the goal of fostering innovation would be best served by
an evaluation of the extent to which patents on genes would
promote or inhibit incentives for research and development in
biotechnology.23 But such reasoning is absent from the court’s
opinion. The court instead drew primarily upon precedent to hold
that genes are “products of nature” and therefore not the proper
subjects of patent protection.24 Of course, the “products of nature”
exception itself is a judicially created limitation on patentable
subject matter that developed not from economic analysis, but from
the slow accretion of precedent.25 The court’s failure to focus on the
economic factors that would shape a policy-based appraisal of gene
patents’ desirability is consistent with the judiciary’s general approach to the problem of patentable subject matter.26 That approach
has drawn criticism from scholars who believe that the application
of formalist legal reasoning is producing poor patent outcomes.27
The second failure arises from the uncertainty created by judicial
decision making. In the case of gene patents, the vagaries of
litigation prevented a core question of patentability from being
20. See Brief for the Appellants at 3 n.1, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, No. 20101406 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2010).
21. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, After Patent on Genes Is Rejected, Taking Stock, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2010, at B1.
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
23. See infra Part I.B; cf. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 20711 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing conflicting evidence of impact of gene patents on scientific
research).
24. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223-33.
25. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 106-30 (4th ed. 2007).
26. See infra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 106-07.
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litigated before the industry assumed significant reliance costs.
Even after the question of patentable subject matter in the case was
decided, there was little guidance concerning the status of gene
patents in future related cases. Bessen and Meurer, among others,
have criticized the patent system’s failure to provide adequate
notice to entrepreneurs and investors about the scope of patent
rights.28 Judicial uncertainty contributes mightily to this problem.29
The central problems that the patent system faces are not all that
different from the institutional design problems that any government program faces. Yet there has been very little serious engagement between the patent system and administrative law. Indeed,
until recently the two areas of law have been treated as largely
separate, with little to do with or learn from one another.30 That is
perhaps because the patent system largely stands outside the
familiar structure of Progressive Era and New Deal agencies.31 The
paradigm of decision making in the modern administrative state
places primary responsibility for developing policy in the hands of
agencies, while the courts ensure that agencies act reasonably and
within their statutory authority.32
28. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 46-72.
29. See infra Part II.B.2.
30. Others have made this observation. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai,
Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95
GEO. L.J. 269, 270 (2007) (“In contrast to commentators and practitioners in other technically
complex areas ..., the patent law community has tended to pay little attention to
administrative law.”); Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the
Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2009) (“Throughout the twentieth
century, administrative law and intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically
sealed off from each other in both theory and practice.”).
31. See John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian
Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1132-40 (2000).
32. Congress has generally delegated to agencies like the Federal Communications
Commission “the authority to promulgate binding legal rules.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005); see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(2006) (“The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in
the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”). When an agency uses that
authority to “address[ ] ambiguity in [its governing] statute or fill[ ] a space in the enacted
law,” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001), the rule of “Chevron requires a
federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute,” so long as that construction
is reasonable. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 843 n.11 (1984)). The court must accept the agency’s
construction because “ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer
are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion,” and
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The administrative structure of the patent system, however,
predates that paradigm. The Patent Office was established in
1836.33 At that time, Congress placed in the hands of the courts the
authority to make policy choices that would implement the broad
language of the Patent Act.34 The PTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority.35 Its role is limited to reviewing applications for
patents and then granting or denying them.36 Of course, in granting
or denying a patent, the PTO necessarily makes a legal judgment
concerning the validity of that patent. But those judgments carry
little legal weight.37 Indeed, until the Supreme Court intervened in
1999, it was not clear that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
even applied to the Patent Office.38
Before considering changes to the institutional structure of the
patent system, it is important to understand how the system
currently works. The examination process begins with the filing of
an application for a patent. In 2009, the PTO received nearly
“filling these gaps ... involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make
than courts.” Id.
33. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117.
34. See Rai, supra note 11, at 1041.
35. The broadest of the PTO’s statutory rule-making powers is the power to “establish
regulations ... which ... shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.” 35 U.S.C. §
2(b)(2)(A) (2006). The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that § 2(b)(2)(A) “does NOT grant
the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80
F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (“A substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the
patent statutes, whether it be section 101, 102, 103, 112 or other section [sic], does not fall
within the usual interpretation of [the language of § 2(b)(2)(A)].”). Instead, “[t]o comply with
section 2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule must be ‘procedural’—i.e., it must ‘govern the conduct
of proceedings in the Office.’” Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (“The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the
application is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.”).
37. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp., the administrative interpretations most likely to receive judicial deference are those made pursuant to
“a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation
that should underlie a pronouncement” that carries the force of law. 533 U.S. at 230.
38. Prior to the Court’s ruling in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal Circuit—the court of
appeals that hears most appeals in patent cases—consistently reviewed the PTO’s factual
determinations for clear error rather than applying the standards of review found in section
706 of the APA. 527 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1999). The Supreme Court held, however, that “the
Federal Circuit’s review of PTO fact-finding must take place within the framework set forth
in the APA.” Id. at 154.
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460,000 such applications and issued 166,706 patents.39 The PTO
employs more than 6,000 examiners, who are organized by technical
expertise.40 An examiner with relevant expertise reviews the
application and makes an initial determination of patentability.
Usually, this determination is only the starting point in a series of
revisions carried out jointly with the applicant. After the initial
review, the applicant may amend her claims to meet the examiner’s
approval, and another similar round of changes or arguments may
follow.41 As several commentators have noted, this interaction
amounts to a negotiation between the PTO and the patent applicant;42 savvy applicants often can “wear down” the examiner.43
Given the large volume of applications and limited resources of the
Office, it is estimated that a patent examiner will ultimately spend
only eighteen hours on average examining each application.44
Notably, this process is entirely ex parte. The only participants are
the examiner and the applicant. There is no opportunity in the
initial examination for other interested parties to come forward with
information relevant to the decision whether the patent should
issue.45
Following the PTO’s decision, the question whether a patent
should issue for a particular invention may reach the courts through
several paths. First, an applicant whose patent is denied by the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)—the PTO’s
internal review board—may appeal directly to the Federal Circuit.46
39. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009 112 tbl.1 (2010) [hereinafter PTO ANNUAL REPORT]. The figures cited
exclude design patents, which are governed by distinct statutory criteria. See 35 U.S.C. §§
171-173.
40. See PTO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 11.
41. Through a device known as a “continuation,” it is possible for the applicant who
receives a final rejection to call for a “do over” at the PTO with very little negative
consequence. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 24. These continuations may be unlimited,
making true final rejections rare. See id. at 24-25.
42. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 6; R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration
and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 215-16, 216 n.194 (2002).
43. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 30, at 316.
44. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 23 & n.10.
45. See id. at 23; Benjamin & Rai, supra note 30, at 278.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006). A disappointed patent applicant may also file suit in the
District Court for the District of Columbia, with a subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit.
See id. § 145; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C). The en banc Federal Circuit has recently held that
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Second, in an infringement suit brought in district court by a patent
holder, a defendant may assert the invalidity of the patent as a
defense. The district court’s determination regarding validity can
then be appealed to the Federal Circuit.47 Originally created to bring
national uniformity to patent law,48 the Federal Circuit has become
the most important expositor of the substantive law of patents in
the United States. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has generally
declined to give any legal weight to the PTO’s substantive interpretations of patent law rendered in the process of granting or denying
patent applications.49 Although the Federal Circuit’s judgments are
reviewable in the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, and the Court
has been more active in recent years in taking patent cases, the
Court’s limited caseload means that much of the development of
patent law is left to the Federal Circuit.
From the perspective of administration, then, the two most
salient features of the patent system are its reliance on case-by-case
adjudication to resolve policy questions in the interstices of the
Patent Act and the delegation of that responsibility primarily to the
courts rather than to an agency. None of the scholarly criticism of
the patent system seriously questions these features. Some
commentators observe that the system’s performance could be
improved through closer adherence to standard principles of
administrative law, but their analyses ask how such principles
might apply to the current institutional arrangement of actors in the
review of the PTO’s decision in such cases is not limited to the record developed before the
agency, as it would otherwise be in an typical challenge to agency action under the APA. See
Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
47. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases “arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents,” 28 U.S.C. § 1338; see id. § 1295(a)(1), and in appeals of
the PTO’s patentability determinations, see id. § 1295(a)(4). In certain circumstances, parties
may also seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
48. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent
Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620 & n.3 (2007).
49. As described above, the PTO lacks substantive rule-making authority. See supra note
35 and accompanying text. Its process for adjudicating patent validity, moreover, bears none
of the hallmarks or formal processes of reasoned decision making that might qualify its
judgments for deference under Chevron and Mead. See, e.g., Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d
1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit has even declined to accord PTO judgments
some—if not controlling—weight under the Skidmore doctrine. See Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 30, at 299-300.
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patent system. Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, for example, argue
that “the Federal Circuit’s review of the PTO should be guided by
administrative law doctrine.”50 They then explore how the comparative institutional features of the Federal Circuit and the PTO, as
they are currently structured, should shape the standard of review
of PTO decisions.51 They conclude that the PTO ought to receive
Chevron deference, or at least significant Skidmore deference, for its
interpretive choices made in the course of patent denials.52 They do
not, however, ask the question whether patent policy ought to be
made through the process of examining patent applications.
Benjamin and Rai do consider how two potential changes to PTO
procedures—a post-grant opposition proceeding and a more rigorous
patent examination—would impact the appropriate standard of
review for the PTO’s legal judgments. They decline, however, to
pursue a broader project of “designing an ideal agency and ideal
agency procedures from scratch” on the ground that such changes
are not politically feasible.53 Similarly, Craig Nard argues that “the
PTO’s patentability determinations are questions of policy” and that
the Federal Circuit’s current standards of review of those determinations are therefore “unsound,”54 but he does not evaluate the
underlying nature or structure of those determinations.
Others seeking the best approach to patent reform often argue in
favor of common law development of patent policy over legislative
solutions, but give short shrift to a third option: agency rulemaking.
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley convincingly demonstrate that patent
policy should be made with a sensitivity to the industry-specific
nature of innovation. They argue that “policy levers,” those flexible
provisions of the Patent Act and the judicial patent doctrine that
allow patent law to be adopted to particular circumstances, should
be applied based on an economic understanding of how innovation

50. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 30, at 319.
51. See id. at 313-15.
52. See id. at 318; see also Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of
Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 226-27 (2000).
53. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 30, at 272. As described below, I am not persuaded that
granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority is a political nonstarter. See infra notes
270-73 and accompanying text.
54. Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415,
1422-23 (1995).
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works in particular contexts.55 They also offer a compelling argument that legislative tailoring of the Patent Act to particular
industries is bound to fail.56 But they do not give serious consideration to the potential for agency rulemaking, noting simply that
agencies are susceptible of capture by the communities they
regulate and that the PTO in particular is exposed to only “one piece
of the patent puzzle”—whether a patent should issue in the first
instance—and not to infringement actions, licensing disputes, or
remedies.57
Similarly, Rai makes a convincing case that the standards of
patentability are fundamentally policy questions that need to be
decided on the basis of sound economics.58 She acknowledges the
institutional limitations courts face in making such judgments.59 Yet
she dismisses the possibility of granting the PTO substantive rulemaking authority because “[i]n order for the PTO to be a reasonably
good policymaker, ... Congress would have to change the PTO into
an altogether different agency,” adding economic expertise and
guarding against capture.60 Others also discount the notion of a
robust PTO.61
This Article undertakes a fresh evaluation of the administrative
structure of the patent system. It asks whether case-by-case adjud55. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 95, 109; see also infra Part I.B.
56. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 95-102.
57. Id. at 106-07.
58. See Rai, supra note 11, at 1101, 1116-22.
59. See id. at 1122-23.
60. Id. at 1134-35; see id. at 1132-33. Since Rai’s article was published, the PTO has begun
the project of building its economic and policy expertise. See Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the
Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 2051, 2054-55 (2009).
61. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the
Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 802 (2010) (“I have left the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office out of this discussion because it was founded before the
Administrative Procedure Act; lacks rule-making authority; and only sees the issues that
arise when a patent is issued, not the ones that come up when patented information is used.”);
John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 518, 547 (2010) (“Vesting the PTO with a rule-making power would, however, have one
overarching and unavoidable problem: rule-making powers give executive agencies the power
to change the rules when political forces change.”); Nard, supra note 11, at 87-88 (“The
preference for the present model may reflect the common law’s historically dominant role.”);
Nard & Duffy, supra note 48, at 1640-41 (“The PTO guideline-writing process may be a good
complement to appellate judging, but is not a perfect substitute.”).
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ication of the validity of individual patents is the optimal manner in
which to make patent policy, and whether the courts are the optimal
actors to make patent policy. It answers both questions in the negative. It therefore makes the case for agency rulemaking instead of
case-by-case judicial development of patent policy. Although this
proposal has received scant attention in the academy, it is far from
a political nonstarter. Indeed, the PTO has lobbied for substantive
rule-making authority,62 and Congress has at least considered such
a grant.63 This Article explains why that proposal is sensible and
should be adopted in the next round of statutory patent reform.
Part I explains the dual nature of the administrative tasks that
the patent system must perform. To be sure, the Patent Act has
always required elaboration and policymaking, but because technology was mostly undifferentiated when the basic institutional
structure of the patent system was established, there was not as
strong a need to make categorical policy choices about the standards
of patentability that would depend on the particulars of a technology
and its application. Today, however, the tasks of adjudicating the
validity of individual patents and of making patent policy may be
distinguished from one another in concept and in practice. That is,
there is a class of policy decisions that can be made separately from
the process of granting and adjudicating individual patents.
Part II explores the optimal institutional structure for carrying
out the distinct task of making patent policy. It begins by laying out
a set of normative principles that should guide the institutional
choice of patent policymaker. The decision-making qualities that are
desirable for issuing and adjudicating patents are different from the
characteristics that mark good policymaking. Sound patent policy
62. See Letter from Gary Locke, Sec’y of Commerce, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and Hon. Jefferson B. Sessions III, Ranking Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary 2-3 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/
documents/111Documents.cfm.
63. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 11 (2007) (as introduced) (“In
addition to the authority conferred by other provisions of this title, the Director may
promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders that the Director determines appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title or any other law applicable to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office or that the Director determines necessary to govern the operation and
organization of the Office.”). Similar language is not included in the patent reform bills
introduced in the House and Senate in the 111th Congress. See Patent Reform Act of 2009,
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
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rests on neither a highly fact-specific determination of an individual
case nor speedy and accurate assessments of a large number of
patents, but on reasoned deliberation and expertise, clarity and
predictability, and transparency and accountability. Judged against
these measures, the current patent system fails to make policy in a
socially optimal manner. The PTO issues patents in great quantity
and with minimal deliberation. But the adversarial process of litigation also fails to produce sound forward-looking policy. Courts do
not allow wide participation, do not take appropriate account of economic analysis and the full range of factors that ought to go into
evaluating the necessity of patent protection on an industry-byindustry basis, and do not provide sufficient predictability or clarity
to support investment. Agency rulemaking fares better along each
of these dimensions. Although agencies have a distinct set of pathologies of their own—the possibility of capture being the most
prominent—institutional analysis must always be done in a comparative fashion, and the comparative advantages of agencies over
courts outweigh the comparative disadvantages.
Finally, Part III describes changes to the existing institutions of
the patent system that should or must accompany a shift to agencybased rulemaking. The PTO, for example, should remain the agency
in charge of both patent examination and rulemaking, but it will
have to be restructured significantly. A shift to rulemaking would
have implications for other actors in the current system as well. It
is not clear, for example, why judicial review of PTO rules should be
confined to the Federal Circuit. Similarly, the advent of binding
agency rules will significantly reshape the contours of patent
validity litigation.
I. THE CHANGING TASKS OF PATENT ADMINISTRATION
The administrative structure of the modern American patent
system was first set forth in the Patent Act of 1836. It has remained
largely unchanged. Yet the administrative tasks that the system
must perform have changed markedly. Part I describes that change.
Technology in 1836 was largely uniform. The patent system
therefore was concerned primarily with defining and enforcing the
boundaries of the exclusive rights that patents conferred. The ad-
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ministrative system that Congress enshrined in the 1836 Act
reflected the nature of that task. Today, by contrast, the patent
system must also adapt patent law to the unique and changing
needs of diverse industries and technologies. That task of selfconscious policymaking is far more complex than the tasks confronting the nineteenth-century patent system. It is therefore worth
questioning whether the existing system—itself a product of historical circumstance and path dependence—remains optimal in light
of the new tasks it must perform.
A. Patent Administration in Historical Perspective
This Section provides a brief overview of how the current institutional structure of the patent system came into being. A full
evaluation of the historical structure of the patent system is beyond
the scope of this Article. Instead, I offer this summary in the service
of two more limited points: first, that there is some degree of historical contingency or path dependence to the current arrangement
of institutional actors; and, second, that the modern administrative
tasks the system confronts are at least different enough that we
should look with fresh eyes at whether the 1836 arrangement
remains optimal.
The modern system of patent examination and administration
has its origin in the Patent Act of 1836.64 That statute established
within the Department of State a “Patent Office,” which the Act
empowered to examine patent applications and to issue patents.65
The 1836 Act thus “created the first real examination system in the
United States.”66 But the Patent Office’s role was limited to determining whether a particular patent application met the statutory
criteria for patentability, and, if it did, the Office was duty-bound to
issue a patent.67 The Act also provided for judicial review of the
64. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
65. See id. §§ 1-2, 6-7. The 1836 Act allowed patents for “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” or any “new and useful improvement on” such. Id. §
6. The statute required putative patentees to submit an application containing a written
description of their inventions and other data. See id.
66. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became Rights
and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 235 (2004).
67. See Patent Act of 1836 § 7.
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Patent Office’s decisions. An infringement defendant could challenge the patent’s validity,68 and a disappointed patent applicant
could appeal the rejection of his application to a “board of examiners.”69 In hearing these cases, the judiciary remained the primary
expositor of patent law.70 This basic structure—an executive body
that examined applications to determine whether the substantive
criteria of patentability were met, coupled with judicial review to interpret and explicate the standards of patentability—has survived
in more or less identical form to this day.71
Of course, the 1836 structure was a product of its time. It
reflected both the particulars—and particular problems—of patent
practice in the early nineteenth century and the prevailing norms
of antebellum administrative governance. Several features of
nineteenth-century patent and administrative practice are important to understanding the Act’s allocation of authority between the
executive and the judiciary.72
Although the establishment of an independent agency that
conducted robust pre-issuance examination was novel, the courts’
primacy in matters of substantive patent law was long-standing.
The first patent statute, passed in 1790, provided for the Secretaries
of State and War and the Attorney General to review patent applications.73 The “patent board,” so constituted, was generally understood to have great discretion in granting or denying patents so long
as certain broad statutory criteria were met.74 Patents in this era
68. See id. § 15.
69. See id. § 7. Three years later, the structure of judicial review was completed with the
addition of review of patent denials in the federal courts. See Act in Addition to “An Act To
Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts,” ch. 88, § 11, 5 Stat. 353, 354-55 (1839).
70. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice and Interest
Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790-1870, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 14), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262970.
71. See Bracha, supra note 66, at 238 (“While other parts of patent law were still to
undergo important changes, by the mid-nineteenth century the ... institutional model of
patents ... acquired its modern form.”); Duffy, supra note 31, at 1079 (“[T]he patent system
continues to thrive with much the same structure that it was given in 1836.”); see also
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT
LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787-1836, at 432 (1998).
72. The scant legislative history of the 1836 Act does not evince any self-conscious debate
over the distribution of tasks between the newly constituted Patent Office and the courts. See
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 71, at 421-27.
73. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (repealed 1793).
74. Bracha, supra note 66, at 220 (“The patent board was not merely an administrative
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still bore the hallmarks of governmentally granted “privileges”
rather than “rights.”75 This system proved quickly to be unworkable.
In 1793, Congress passed a new patent statute that eliminated
patent examination; instead, a patent that satisfied minimal formal
requirements would issue upon filing of the application with the
Patent Office in a process that became known as “registration.”76 An
inventor simply “registered” his invention and received a patent. For
more than forty years during the registration era, then, the courts
were entirely responsible for the development of patent law.77 It is
therefore perhaps unsurprising that the courts would retain most
of this role under the new regime.
Indeed, the new Patent Office appears to have been intended to
serve primarily as “a check upon the granting of patents,” rather
than as an institution for tackling and solving the substantive
issues that arise in patent enforcement.78 That position was also
consistent with then-prevailing views of administrative governance.
As John Duffy and others have observed, Jacksonian governance
was skeptical about the competence and reliability of administrative
institutions, and that skepticism extended to the new Patent
Office.79
The task of elaborating the criteria for patentability in the first
half of the nineteenth century was also significantly different from
agency assigned the mere task of certifying the fulfillment of standard patentability criteria
and the duty of issuing a patent when they were met. Instead, it was an arm of the sovereign
with full discretionary power to weigh public policies and make case-specific decisions as to
whether to grant.”).
75. Id. at 222-23.
76. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-21; see Bracha, supra note 66, at 227.
77. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 71, at 355 (“[A] registration system placed the burden
of determining patent issues on the courts.”); Bracha, supra note 66, at 228 (“[A]ll substantive
decisions regarding patents were now to be made by the courts whenever a conflict was laid
at their doors.”); Morriss & Nard, supra note 70, at 7 (“The 1793 Act shifted the ex ante
gatekeeper role performed by an examination to an ex post proceeding in the courts.”). As
described above, the new Patent Office was not granted the authority to promulgate
substantive rules. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
78. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 71, at 425 (quoting 1836 Senate Committee Report, 18 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 853 (1936)); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and
“The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J.
1568, 1580 (2008) (“Under this system, the Patent Office took some of the load off of the
courts, but the development of the law of patentability remained largely in judicial hands, as
it is today.”).
79. See Duffy, supra note 31, at 1132-39. See generally Mashaw, supra note 78.

2011]

RULES FOR PATENTS

1765

what it is today. As Robert Merges has explained, nineteenthcentury technology was fairly uniform—“[a]t the very least ... if you
put technology in a bag and shook it, it would make some noise.”80
That is, most technological innovations took place within a welldefined sphere of invention: “Everyone knew that manufactures and
machines were at the core of the patent system. Agricultural and
industrial machinery was almost synonymous with ‘patents.’”81
Although there was some variety in the industrial settings in which
mechanical inventions were used,82 the underlying technology still
comprised basic machinery. Patentable subject matter was therefore
a rarely discussed concept in the patent jurisprudence of the first
half of the nineteenth century.83
Instead, patent litigation and the judicial development of patent
law prior to 1836 focused primarily on the establishment and
enforcement of patent boundaries. As one commentator noted,
“[p]atent law rather quickly came to be recognized as property law
directed to that particular form of intellectual property known as
patents.”84 The analogy to land often was explicit. Grants of property from the public lands were known as “land patents,” and
“[c]ross-citation of patent cases in public lands cases and vice versa
... was common.”85 The “boundaries” of patents were policed primarily by juries sitting in infringement cases.86 Patent litigation
was highly fact specific.87 Morriss and Nard describe the process as
follows:
80. Merges, supra note 1, at 585.
81. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3242-46 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the eighteenth and nineteenth century understanding of
the “useful arts”); Brief for the Respondent at 16-25, Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (No. 08-964)
(same).
82. See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INNOVATION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 72 tbl.3.2 (2005) (defining
relevant industrial sectors to include agriculture, building, manufacturing, transport, and
“other”).
83. Merges, supra note 1, at 585.
84. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 71, at 305.
85. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public
Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 130 & n.32 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt
Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (citing cases).
86. See Morriss & Nard, supra note 70, at 8-10.
87. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1770 (2009) (“[T]he parties litigated validity and
infringements as largely factual questions.”).
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During litigation, the jury would peruse the written description
to determine what the invention was, or at least, the principle
underlying the invention. The jury, however, had the difficult job
of comparing the accused product with the patentee’s invention
because the jury was required to discern abstract principles of
the invention from the patent document’s textual description
and schematic representations.88

To be sure, the courts developed interpretations of the key
patentability requirements, including novelty and utility. But the
development of those concepts was often decidedly case specific. In
one line of cases interpreting the utility requirement, for example,
the courts viewed that criterion as a mechanism “to review patents
based on their discretionary assessments of the net public effects of
specific inventions.”89 This inquiry did not implicate general policy
concerns, but rather was focused on “substantive evidence and
arguments regarding the social benefits and effects of the relevant
inventions.”90
Taking these factors together, the 1836 administrative structure
appears to reflect the tasks of the 1836 patent system. Technology
was relatively undifferentiated and patent disputes were mostly fact
specific.91 Administrative governance was in the early stages of
development and robust federal agencies had yet to come into
being.92 As a result, the administrative structure enshrined in the
1836 Act provided for the development of patent law in a casespecific manner focused on the courts. Regardless of whether that
structure was optimal at the time, there can be little doubt that
underlying changes in patent practice over time give us cause to
reconsider whether it is optimal today.
B. Administrative Tasks Confronting the Modern Patent System
Nearly 175 years have passed since the patent system’s modern
form took shape. Those intervening years have seen vast changes in
technology and industry. The first iteration of the Patent Office
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Morriss & Nard, supra note 70, at 9.
Bracha, supra note 66, at 230.
Id. at 231.
See supra notes 80-83, 86-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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employed seven people—two examiners, two assistant examiners,
two draftsmen, and a machinist—for the first decade of its existence.93 Between 1840 and 1849, those examiners issued roughly
5500 patents primarily for developments in mechanical technology.94
In 2009, the PTO issued over 150,000 patents.95 In so doing, it employed over 6000 examiners96 spread across eight different “technology centers”:97 biotechnology and organic chemistry; chemical
and materials engineering; computer architecture and software;
networking, multiplexing, cable, and security; communications;
semiconductors, electrical and optical systems and components;
transportation, construction, electronic commerce, agriculture,
national security, and license and review; and mechanical engineering, manufacturing, and products and designs.98 The advent of
significantly differentiated technology coupled with the high volume
of patent applications received and reviewed means that there are
at least two separate administrative tasks that the system must
now accomplish: determining the validity of individual patents and
making policy judgments about the application of patent law to
diverse technologies.
The first administrative task has changed in degree since the
inception of the patent system. At each stage of the process of
determining a patent’s validity, the volume of such determinations
has increased markedly. The PTO now receives close to 500,000
patent applications each year.99 An examiner will spend eighteen
hours on average examining a patent application to determine
whether it meets the criteria for a patent to issue.100 The courts, in
turn, have seen a marked increase in the volume of patent litigation. From 1830 to 1839, the federal courts heard 37 patent cases.101
Today, the number of patent lawsuits filed per year is over 2500,
93. See Morriss & Nard, supra note 70, at 5 n.13.
94. See KHAN, supra note 82, at 71 tbl.3.1.
95. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
96. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Utility, Plant, and Reissue Examiner Staffing,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/examstaffing.jsp (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
97. Excluding the technology center for design patents. See supra note 39.
98. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patents Organization, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/organization.jsp (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). Within each of those technology centers,
examiners are broken down into further areas of specialization called “art units.”
99. PTO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 112 tbl.1.
100. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
101. KHAN, supra note 82, at 71 tbl.3.1.
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and that number is increasing.102 The last twenty years in particular
have seen an explosion of patent litigation.103 The key challenges
posed by increasing volume include figuring out how to process and
adjudicate such a large volume of patents.
Distinct from the task of determining whether an individual
patent is valid is the task of elaborating the criteria of patentability.
That task requires some amount of abstraction from the particulars
of individual inventions. Such abstraction may occur at a variety of
levels of more or less generality.104 In all events, it requires the relevant decision maker to draw distinctions based on the technological
and economic characteristics of highly diverse industries and inventions. In a series of influential works, Burk and Lemley have
chronicled the increasing technological and economic variety of
innovation and what it means for the patent system.105 They demonstrate that different industries exhibit marked differences in the
ways in which they innovate. The cost of R&D, and therefore the
need to recoup significant upfront investment, is quite different
from one industry to another.106 Pharmaceutical innovation, for
instance, requires enormous time and capital, owing in no small
part to the significant regulatory requirements for the approval of
new human drugs.107 The archetype of software innovation, on the
other hand, is two guys working in a garage.108 Similarly, the availability of other mechanisms for appropriating the gains from
investments in R&D—and the need, therefore, for the ex ante
incentives provided by patents—varies on an industry basis.109 Most
102. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 122 fig.6.1.
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 130-50 and accompanying text.
105. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 49; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156-57 (2002); Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003) [hereinafter Burk
& Lemley, Policy Levers].
106. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 38-41.
107. Id. at 39.
108. Id. at 40.
109. Id. at 42-46; Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1257
(2009); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 784-86 (1987); Wesley M. Cohen,
Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), 2-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
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mechanical inventions, for example, are “self-disclosing,” that is,
they can be reverse engineered by competitors with minimal
effort.110 Others are less easily replicated and therefore patent
protection is less important.111
Finally, the degree to which innovation requires access to critical
inputs that themselves may be the subject of intellectual property
protection varies. It is well understood that innovation often is a
cumulative process.112 But the importance of cumulative innovation,
and the effect of intellectual property on the efficiency of cumulative
innovation, varies by technology. In pharmaceuticals, for example,
products tend to be stand-alone. A single patent covers a single
product, without much need for follow-on work. In software, by contrast, cumulative innovation is a critical component of the product
development cycle. As Burk and Lemley note, the conventional
wisdom in the software industry is that “you shouldn’t buy version
1.0 of any program. The expectation is that the programs will be
incrementally improved over time.”113 In some areas of biotechnology, cumulative innovation works differently. Because much of
product development depends on applying the tools of basic science,
a large number of inputs are needed for new innovation. When those
research tools are themselves the subjects of patent protection, an
“anticommons” may arise, in which follow-on research is inhibited
by the need to clear rights to many different inventions.114
As a result of these systematic variations in the underlying
technology and economics of innovation, different industries experience the patent system in different ways.115 Burk and Lemley
point to industry-based differences in firms’ propensities to seek
patent protection in the first instance, and to differences in the
patent prosecution process, in the scope of patents, and in the use
and enforcement of patents. Bessen and Meurer demonstrate empirically that the value of patents differs markedly by industry.
110. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 105.
111. See Burstein, supra note 5.
112. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
113. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 47.
114. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998).
115. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 49-59.
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Indeed, they conclude that pharmaceutical and chemical patents
provide a net benefit to their holders after litigation costs; patents
in most other industries do not.116
The conclusion that Burk and Lemley draw from these observations is straightforward: the patent system “can, and should, apply
the general rules of patent law with sensitivity to the characteristics
of particular industries.”117 If a particular rule results in social
welfare gains when it is applied to one technology, but social welfare
losses when applied to another, it should be applied to the former
and not the latter. This common-sense observation implies that the
patent system must sometimes make categorical judgments about
the application of general rules to particular industries or technologies.
This is not to say, however, that all decisions implementing the
Patent Act will optimally create a one-to-one correspondence between a single legal principle and a single industry. Sometimes
sensitivity to technological and economic particulars will require
making a policy that is specific to a single type of invention.118 At
other times, however, the categorical choice will be drawn more
broadly. Although Burk and Lemley’s insight has led some critics to
complain about the prospect of a balkanized patent system in which
the rules vary by technology, technology-sensitive policymaking
may not necessarily lead to such a system.119 Patent law already
accommodates technological specificity in part by virtue of the factspecific nature of many patentability determinations.120 Take, for
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 138-42, 139 fig.6.5.
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109.
See id. at 110.
See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 367, 372 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) [hereinafter
Wagner, Against Exceptionalism] (describing how Burk and Lemley’s proposal “shifts
consideration of the patent law from a general background principle of property rights to a
vehicle for particularistic, technology-specific innovation policy choices”); see also Clarisa
Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. L. 44, 47-49 (2008) (“Special rules for each
industry run the danger of defining a market that will be difficult to change.”); R. Polk
Wagner, Comment, Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 749, 750 (2004) [hereinafter Wagner, Exactly Backwards] (distinguishing Burk
and Lemley’s proposal from “micro-exceptionalism, .... [t]he normal course of things”).
120. See Wagner, Against Exceptionalism, supra note 119, at 370-72; Wagner, Exactly
Backwards, supra note 119, at 750. It is worth noting that Burk and Lemley likely would not
disagree entirely with this proposition. They distinguish between “macro” policy levers and
“micro” policy levers. In their view, the “micro” levers continue to operate on a case-by-case
116.
117.
118.
119.
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example, the determination whether an invention “would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art.”121 This standard is expressly tied to an
industry- or technology-specific determination about the level of
skill of an average practitioner in the field. Through this and other
similar standards that are flexibly applied to different technologies,
patent law necessarily exhibits some tailoring.122
The question whether such tailoring should be case-specific or
more general ultimately is a new iteration of the classic jurisprudential debate between rules and standards.123 In the usual formulation, rules are costlier to establish but easier to apply and
enforce, while standards are cheaper to establish but harder to
apply.124 Rules are bright-line and clear. Standards are flexible and
adaptable. The question whether rules or standards make for better
patent law is complicated.125 It is sufficient here to note several
features of the debate that suggest that a preference for standards
over rules does not eliminate the need for industry- or technologyspecific patent policymaking. First, the choice between rules and
standards is itself a policy choice. One key lesson from the literature
on rules and standards is that there is not a bipolar choice to be
made in fashioning legal principles. Instead, the choice between
rules and standards is a question of optimization.126 Second, the
choice between rules and standards is necessarily context specific.
In Louis Kaplow’s framework, for example, the choice of a rule or a
standard is driven by the cost of creating or articulating the legal

basis, but have a disparate impact on an industry that arises through application. See BURK
& LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109-10.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
122. See Mark D. Janis, Comment, Equilibrium in a Technology-Specific Patent System,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 743 (2004).
123. The literature on rules versus standards is deep and rich. For classic contributions to
the debate, see, for example, Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,
93 YALE L.J. 65, 66 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 562 (1992); and Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953,
959 (1995).
124. See Kaplow, supra note 123, at 577.
125. For some discussion of this problem, see, for example, John F. Duffy, Rules and
Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609 (2009); John R.
Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003); and Wagner, supra
note 42, at 234-37.
126. See Diver, supra note 123, at 71-79.
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principle and the ease of conforming one’s conduct to that principle.127 In the context of patent policy, those factors will be determined by, inter alia, the extent to which a given type of technology
has clearly defined uses, the volume of patents likely to emerge from
a given technological class, and the uncertainty associated with
individualized determinations of patentability.128 Evaluating these
various factors requires deep knowledge of technological and
economic particulars.
The space for technology-specific policymaking, therefore, is not
reduced by a reliance on standards. Indeed, it is perhaps even
expanded; the choice of a rule or a standard in the first instance is
a policy choice no less than the formulation of that particular rule
or standard.129 Both determinations are subject to analysis that
takes into account the particular technological and economic contexts in which the legal principle is to operate. A few examples
highlight the range of potential decisions to be made.
In some instances, a bright-line rule will be the most appropriate
legal principle. Consider, for example, the problem of patents for
expressed sequence tags (ESTs). ESTs are short sequences of DNA
that are derived from longer genes.130 An EST ’s primary use is to
serve as a “marker” to identify a full-length gene that can then be
analyzed to determine their functions.131 ESTs can be produced,
however, without any knowledge about the genes to which they
correspond, the proteins that those genes encode, or the biological
functions that those proteins perform.132 It is possible, therefore, to
produce a large number of ESTs in a relatively short amount of
time, and then to use the ESTs over years of subsequent research
into the genes to which they correspond.133 Controversy erupted over
the patenting of ESTs in 1991 when the National Institutes of
127. See Kaplow, supra note 123, at 562-63.
128. Cf. id. at 563-64.
129. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
130. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert
P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the
Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2-3 (1995).
131. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367.
132. See id. at 1373.
133. See id. (“Essentially, the claimed ESTs act as no more than research intermediates
that may help scientists to isolate the particular underlying protein-encoding genes and
conduct further experimentation on those genes.”).
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Health (NIH) submitted patent applications claiming over 6800
ESTs produced during preliminary work on the Human Genome
Project.134 Critics contended that if patents were to issue for these
short segments of DNA prior to isolation and analysis of the full
genes and proteins to which they correspond, the EST patent
holders would effectively control all uses of those subsequent inventions.135 There would also be the potential for an “anticommons”
problem because many ESTs held by different patent holders could
correspond to a single gene.136 Although the NIH abandoned its
patent claims in 1994,137 the PTO continued to grapple with the
problem. In 2001, following public notice and comment, the PTO
promulgated guidelines for its examiners that concluded that
applicants claiming ESTs could not satisfy the utility requirement
of the Patent Act without showing that they had actually used the
ESTs to isolate or perform research on the downstream genes.138
The Federal Circuit adopted a similar approach.139 This requirement
of specific utility is usually not invoked with respect to other technologies.140 But because of the particular characteristics of ESTs and
their interaction with downstream research, a bright-line rule in
this context made the most sense.
In the case of ESTs, the technological and economic circumstances
in which the inventions would be used were clear enough to make
the development of a bright-line rule appropriate. In other areas of
patent law, a mix of rules and standards—and a mix that changes
over time—may prove optimal. Consider the problem of business
method patents. It has long been the case that abstract ideas are not
patentable subject matter.141 As John Duffy has explained, “the
doctrine against abstractions is a general standard without crisp
delineations.”142 The inquiry into whether an invention represents
134. See Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 130, at 2; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at
699
135. See Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 130, at 18-19, 38.
136. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 699.
137. See Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 130, at 3.
138. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093-94 (Jan. 5, 2001).
139. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 112.
141. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
142. Duffy, supra note 125, at 646.
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an abstract idea is fact specific and blends with other considerations
of patentability. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that
the question whether business methods are patentable is to be
decided on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the prohibition
on abstract ideas.143 But that need not have been its conclusion. The
Federal Circuit had held that the patentability of business methods
turned on whether the process was “tied to a particular machine or
apparatus” or “transforms a particular article into a different state
or thing.”144 That is a more rule-like formulation, though it is still
highly general; in other words, it could apply to any number of
technological or economic settings. More particularly, Justice
Stevens, dissenting from the Court’s reasoning in Bilski, would have
held simply that business methods were categorically excluded from
patentability.145
The choice among these three approaches to the problem of
business method patents is a policy choice. The legal principle one
adopts depends on one’s views of the relative merits of more rulelike or more standard-like formulations. And one’s view of the
merits of that choice depends on an analysis of the relative costs and
benefits of different legal principles; that analysis inevitably turns
on the specific technological and economic context of the rule or
standard. Rules and standards, moreover, need not be mutually
exclusive, nor does the choice of a rule or a standard need to remain
constant over time. As the Bilski Court acknowledged, there remained room for the “development of other limiting criteria” that
may have fared better than the Federal Circuit’s “machine-ortransformation” test.146 Categorical rules can be carved out from
broader standards as experience and changing circumstances
dictate.147
Finally, even where a pure standard is optimal, there are still
policy decisions to be made in formulating that standard. The
Supreme Court has articulated, for example, several “secondary
considerations” that are relevant to the question of obviousness.148
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

130 S. Ct. at 3231.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 3231.
See Duffy, supra note 125, at 614-15.
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John
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These considerations include the commercial success of the invention, whether it meets a long-felt but unsolved need, whether others
have failed in trying to achieve the same goal, and other such
expressly policy-based considerations.149 These secondary considerations together form a standard—they are applied neutrally across
technologies, yet ultimately produce different outcomes based on
particular facts and circumstances.150 But as Burk and Lemley
explain, the Supreme Court’s choice of secondary factors to include
in the analysis is “policy-based ... result[ing] from the court’s belief
that the reaction of the market,” for example, “will show that certain
inventions are more deserving of protection than others.”151
Regardless whether a rule or a standard is adopted to govern an
element of patentability, policy analysis plays a critical role in
articulating the legal principle. That policy analysis, moreover, need
not be coupled with the determination of the validity of a particular
patent. The PTO’s Utility Examination guidelines were formulated
in response to a particular class of patents: ESTs.152 Of course, the
analysis was informed by the particulars of that class, but the PTO
could and did carry it out separately from the examination process.153 Similarly, a policymaker could decide to exclude categories
of patentable subject matter or articulate secondary considerations
of nonobviousness outside the confines of a particular case. Indeed,
this policymaking is what agencies with substantive rule-making
authority do with great frequency. The next Part considers whether
these policy judgments are best made through case-by-case adjudication in agencies and courts or through rulemaking.

Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
149. See id.; see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 117-18 (discussing policy-based
nature of secondary considerations of nonobviousness).
150. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 117.
151. Id.
152. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Press Release, USPTO
Publishes Final Guidelines for Determining Utility of Gene-Related Inventions (Jan. 4, 2001),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2001/01-01.jsp; supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
153. Cf. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372.
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II. WHY PATENT POLICY SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH AGENCY
RULEMAKING
Sound patent administration requires significantly more policymaking than it did at the time the major institutions of the
system were established. This Part asks whether the old institutional structure remains optimal. I first develop a set of normatively
attractive decision-making attributes for patent policy. I next explain why the current institutional arrangement fails to uphold
these principles, and suggest that they are better implemented
through agency-based rulemaking. Of course, agency rulemaking is
not an institutional arrangement free from flaws. Nevertheless, I
argue that on balance such a system would represent an improvement over the current arrangement.
A. A Normative Theory of Patent Administration
A well-functioning patent system will perform two distinct tasks:
it will assess the validity of individual patents and engage in
forward-looking policymaking with respect to the standards of patentability.154 But performing each of these tasks well requires
different skills in the relevant decision maker. Take patent examination first.155 The PTO must process a significant volume of patent
applications, and must do so with both speed and accuracy.156 That
requires organizing a large number of examiners, incentivizing
them, and giving them clear direction.157 It also requires the development of tools and processes for making relatively quick legal
judgments that are necessarily subject to further revision where
154. See supra Part I.B.
155. A significant literature has developed around the problem of poor patent “quality.”
This literature seeks to improve the operation of the PTO to reduce the number of granted
patents that do not meet the statutory criteria for patentability. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner,
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009). The
question of how to improve the patent examination process is distinct from the question of
how to improve the patent policy-making process, and is beyond the scope of this Article.
156. Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy refer to these tasks as the “production problem”
and the “mass-justice” problem. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the
Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1546-64 (2009).
157. See id. at 1546-58.
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time and resources permit.158 Lemley calls this understanding
“rational ignorance”—“[b]ecause so few patents are ever asserted
against a competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed
validity determinations in those few cases than to invest additional
resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”159
Once a granted patent, or a denied application, is the subject of
litigation, the adjudication of patentability requires courts to make
quite detailed and nuanced applications of law to the particular
factual circumstances of the patent and the dispute.160 Determining
patent validity in the face of third-party challenges requires detailed
fact-finding about the circumstances surrounding the invention, the
characteristics of the invention itself, and the place of the invention
in the broader technological art of which it is a part.
Patent policymaking requires different skills. Policymaking is
prospective. It is categorical. It requires neither the high-throughput speed and accuracy of patent examination nor the comprehensive fact-finding of litigation. Instead, it requires the decision maker
to abstract from particular circumstances to formulate more general
rules or standards. Recall that the normative goal of the patent
system is to provide incentives for innovation.161 The standards of
patentability are key policy levers by which those incentives can be
adjusted toward the optimum.162 In setting those standards, the
following decision attributes are critical.
1. Reasoned Decision Making and Expertise
“Innovation policy” aims to use the mechanisms of government to
foster and promote the optimal level of technological innovation in
a society.163 Patent policy in particular requires the application of
158. Id. at 1558-64.
159. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497
& n.6 (2001).
160. See id. at 1502.
161. See supra note 4.
162. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 95 (defining “policy levers” as those flexible
provisions of the patent statute and its associated judicially developed doctrines that allow
the rules of patent to be tailored to particular circumstances).
163. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2008). Neo-Schumpeterian economics teaches
that technological change is an “endogenous” variable, the magnitude of which is determined
in part by government policy. See id. at 12; Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous
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technological and economic analysis to a set of legal tools—“policy
levers” in Burk and Lemley’s parlance—set forth in the patent
statute. Determining when and how to use those mechanisms
requires reasoned decision making, which itself requires that the
policymaker have access to economic and technological information,
that the policymaker be capable of analyzing and interpreting that
information, and that it have sufficient authority to choose among
competing alternative solutions to any given policy problem.
Because the characteristics of technological innovation vary
systematically by industry and technology, the policymaker must be
able to acquire sufficient industry- and technology-specific information to operate the policy levers effectively.164 There are at least
three sources of critical information that a policymaker needs in
order to determine how patent law should be implemented on an
industry- or technology-specific basis. The decision maker first
needs information about the relevant technology. This may include
data about a specific invention or class of inventions that could be
the subject of an application or a patent. But it also more broadly
includes information about the technological field of which any
particular invention is a part. Second, the decision maker needs
information about the economics of R&D broadly and more specifically in the context of a particular industry or industries.165 Finally,
the decision maker needs information about the industrial organization and market structure of a particular industry and about
noneconomic factors that may be important to the analysis.166 In
short, determining whether a given set of rules promotes or deters
innovation requires an understanding of the relevant technology,
the relevant economic principles, and the relevant industry.
With that information in hand, the decision maker can then
engage in policy analysis. That analysis is expressly pragmatic in
nature—it asks what policy is most likely to reach a desired normative outcome. The dominant paradigm of analysis for innovation
policy—much like economic policy more broadly—is cost-benefit
analysis.167 In cost-benefit analyses, the policymaker determines the
Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1994).
164. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
165. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 38-41.
166. Id. at 41-42, 44-46.
167. See DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
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likely costs or benefits of a particular government intervention, and
compares that calculus with the alternatives. In the modern administrative state, cost-benefit analysis is a defining principle:
In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives,
including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits
shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the
fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify,
but nevertheless essential to consider.168

Finally, policy analysis necessarily entails a choice among competing options to best achieve a desired goal. This is especially so
with respect to patent policy. Although there is broad agreement
that patent law exists to foster innovation, agreement among
experts ends there. The theoretical justifications for patent law are
a subject of debate.169 And economic analysis does not provide a perfect measure of the performance of individual policies in implementing those goals.170 To take just one example, Michael Heller and
Rebecca Eisenberg articulated in 1998 the possibility that patents
on research tools in biotechnology were contributing to the formation of an “anticommons,” in which fragmented ownership of inputs
prevented their use in downstream innovation.171 It is disputed in
the literature whether the anticommons model is correct as a matter
of theory, and therefore whether it should guide patent policy in
biotechnology.172 It is also disputed as an empirical matter whether

340-41 (4th ed. 2005).
168. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993).
169. As Burk and Lemley note, competing theories of patent policy also operate on an
industry-specific basis. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 66-78.
170. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 209-10; Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness
Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1838 (2003) (“[E]ven as basic a
question as the optimal length of copyright or patent terms is incredibly hard to answer using
an efficiency-based economic analysis.”).
171. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 698.
172. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem?
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1061-62 (2008).

1780

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1747

the phenomenon that Heller and Eisenberg posited actually
occurs.173
In an ideal world, the efficacy of patent policy could be determined with certainty and used to guide legal and regulatory choices.
But we do not live in such a perfect world. Ultimately, then, there
must be a premium placed on the exercise of reasoned judgment
with respect to patent policy, bringing the available economic tools
to bear on informed decision making.
2. Clarity and Predictability
Patents can be thought of as a kind of property right, at least in
some respects.174 A patent grants its holder the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling her invention.175 A significant
body of legal and economic literature has explained that property
rights function optimally when they are clear and stable.176 When
property rights are well-defined and easy to enforce, they can provide incentives for investment and a basis for efficient market
exchange.177 Conversely, when property rights are ill-defined, or the
rules governing those property rights are insufficiently clear or
secure, the system may not yield efficient results.178 These insights
apply to the patent system just as they do to real property. In order
173. See id. at 1063-75 (reviewing empirical studies).
174. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 2, 29-34; Duffy, supra note 125, at 610; Henry
E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE
L.J. 1742, 1745 (2007). Of course, patents are not completely analogous to traditional rights
in tangible property, such as land. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 33. And patents
may be conceptualized other than as property rights. For a treatment of patents as public
regulation, see, for example, Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the
Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1317 (2004). There is
no reason, moreover, that patents cannot be conceived of both in property and public
regulation terms. After all, property rights in land are subject to significant regulation
through modern land-use regimes. It also is worth noting that the importance of clarity in
property rights does not diminish the case for clarity in regulation. Regulations, too, must be
clear in order to be effective.
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
176. See Duffy, supra note 125, at 610 n.1.
177. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 34-35; see also Richard Epstein, Property and
Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 4 (1990); Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577-78, (1988).
178. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 38-39; Epstein, supra note 177, at 7; Rose, supra
note 177, at 590.
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for patents to succeed, the rules that govern their issuance and
validity must be clear and predictable.179
As a practical matter, the need for secure property rights suggests
two important characteristics that sound policymaking should
embody. The first is prospectivity. That is, at the time the rules are
set, they should be understood to operate prospectively without
change through happenstance. Policy in this area should aim to
shape expectations ex ante. Once reasonable expectations of the
state of the law regarding patents are in place, inventors and
entrepreneurs will make investment decisions in reliance upon
those settled expectations. Of course, changes in policy are inevitable in light of ever-changing technological and economic conditions.
But those changes ideally should not occur spontaneously. Instead,
they should reflect considered responses to recognized changes in
the relevant circumstances. Although there will always remain a
role for ex post dispute settlement, setting ex ante expectations is
critical to well-performing property systems.180
The second characteristic of sound policymaking is clarity.
Although clear legal rules tend to promote stability and certainty,
intellectual property policy puts a similar premium on flexibility.181
That is because changes in technology and economics demand that
the law adapt to different circumstances. As described above, the
debate between rules and standards has particular salience in patent law.182 Ultimately, the need to balance clear rules that promote
investment with flexible standards that are adaptable to changing
circumstances requires optimization. Sound patent policymaking,
therefore, will attempt to optimize the specificity of the legal
principle to provide adequate levels of both clarity and flexibility. I
use the term “clarity,” therefore, not to refer to the choice between
a rule and a standard, but rather to refer to the need to clearly
articulate a legal principle regardless of its specificity or generality.
179. Bessen and Meurer use the insight that property rights must be clear in order to be
effective as the core of their critique of the patent system. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note
2, at 46-47. Bessen and Meurer focus their argument on the scope of issued patents, contending that defects in the process of offering notice of valid patents lead to suboptimal followon innovation. Id. at 147. But their observation about the importance of predictability and
clarity applies just as well to matters of patent policy.
180. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 11, at 55.
182. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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3. Transparency and Accountability
Most questions of patent policy are contested.183 Policy analysis
will not yield a single right answer to every disputed question.
Instead, policy analysis requires the decision maker to understand
competing viewpoints and make an informed decision—often an
exercise of discretion—about which of those viewpoints is most
likely to yield the best outcome. If the relevant decision maker is to
resolve these disagreements, it must have access to all of the
relevant arguments. The decision-making process must be broadly
participatory.
This is particularly true with respect to patents. The most influential group of stakeholders in patent policy has traditionally been
patent holders and their lawyers.184 Perhaps unsurprisingly, those
groups generally advocate for strong and broad patent rules that
will result in the maximum benefit for patent holders.185 Of course,
maximal patent protection may not be the optimal policy in all circumstances. In setting patent policy, the decision maker must take
into account the views of many different stakeholders. Those views
will not be uniform even within the private sector. For years, for
example, the pharmaceutical and information technology industries
have taken opposing positions on critical questions of patent law
that have been the subject of legislative debate.186 Universities have
played an expanded role in shaping innovation policy since the
Bayh-Dole Act granted them the ability to patent inventions made
through the use of government research grants.187 Universities have
183. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 105, at 1580 (noting disagreement).
184. See Morriss & Nard, supra note 70, at 4; see also Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus
Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 17), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1608111 (noting
that patent owners are the most frequent amicus participants in appellate patent
proceedings).
185. See, e.g., Am. Intellectual Property Law Ass’n, About AIPLA, http://www.aipla.org/
about/who/Pages/AIPLA-Strategic-Plan.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (noting that a strong
intellectual property system provides daily value and benefits).
186. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 101 (“The pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries opposed virtually all elements of patent reform directed at abuse.... On the other
side, the software, electronics, Internet, and telecommunications industries generally lined
up behind reform, but expressed skepticism toward those few reforms the pharmaceutical
industry supported.”); Nard, supra note 11, at 52 & n.2.
187. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
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become critical sources of innovation and key players in early-stage
technology development.188
Finally, the non-patent-holding public at large has a significant
interest in seeing that patent policy is made for the public good
rather than for the private benefit of industrial, governmental, or
academic actors in the system. A number of interest groups have
sprung up in recent years to advocate for the public interest in
intellectual property policy.189 These groups approach the problem
of innovation policy from a position different than that of industry.
To take one example, the Public Patent Foundation “represents the
public’s interests against undeserved patents and unsound patent
policy.”190 The diversity of views among competing interests is a
positive for sound patent policymaking, and should be incorporated
into patent policymaking.
B. Allocating Policy-Making Authority
With an understanding of the characteristics of efficacious patent policymaking in place, the next question is whether courts or
agencies are better positioned to make policy choices in a manner
that reflects those characteristics. The answer depends on the comparative institutional competences of courts and agencies. One of
the key insights from the literature on comparative institutional
analysis is that no institutional arrangement will be perfect in all
circumstances.191 The following discussion, therefore, does not seek

Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290-91 (2003).
188. Id. at 291.
189. See, e.g., Pub. Patent Found., About PUBPAT, http://www.pubpat.org/About.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2011) (“PUBPAT works to strengthen the patent system by introducing a
healthy amount of non-patentee input to help the system achieve high quality and balanced
policies.”); Public Knowledge, Mission Statement, http://www.publicknowledge.org/about/
what/mission (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (describing goal as “[e]nsuring that U.S. intellectual
property law and policy reflect the ‘cultural bargain’ intended by the framers of the
constitution: providing an incentive to creators and innovators while benefiting the public
through the free flow of information and ideas”).
190. Pub. Patent Found., http://www.pubpat.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (capitalization
altered).
191. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994) (“The choice is always a choice among highly
imperfect alternatives. The strengths and weaknesses of one institution versus another vary
from one set of circumstances to another.”).
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to construct an ideal institution. Instead, it expressly compares the
potential benefits and drawbacks of patent policymaking through
judicial adjudication and agency rulemaking.
The analysis below would be incomplete without briefly considering a third option: legislation. Like other commentators, I am
skeptical of the efficacy of legislative tailoring of patent policy to
suit the needs of particular industries or technologies.192 The last
several Congresses’ inability to fashion a Patent Reform Act that
could satisfy the needs of diverse industries is evidence of the difficulty of legislative change.193 Although, as discussed below, administrative rules are subject to the problem of “ossification”; statutes
are significantly less flexible than administrative rules.194 Statutes
can take years of legislative negotiation to enact. By the time
proposed legislation passes both houses of Congress, technology
often has moved on. The last two congressional attempts to create
industry-specific patent legislation demonstrate this problem.
Neither the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act195 nor the biotechnology-specific amendments to the obviousness statute196 have been
invoked with any regularity to enforce the rights they purport to
create. Both statutes were enacted after several years of legislative
debate over the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights in
their respective fields. By the time they were in place, they were of
virtually no use.197
One further clarification is necessary: in the discussion that
follows I contrast agency rulemaking with judicial adjudication. But
agencies also have the power to make policy through adjudication.198
I put the agency adjudication option largely to the side, for several
192. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 96-106; Nard, supra note 11, at 106-08; Rai,
supra note 11, at 1127-31.
193. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009,
H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008); Patent
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2008) (as amended by Senate, Jan. 24, 2008);
Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (as amended by House, Sept. 4,
2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005,
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
194. See sources cited infra note 239.
195. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006).
196. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b).
197. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 98-99.
198. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he choice between
rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s discretion.”).
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reasons. First, agency adjudication and judicial adjudication share
many of the same features and bugs. Measured against the criteria
developed in Part II.A, agency adjudication is likely to be superior
to judicial adjudication in marshalling relevant expertise, but the
effectiveness of adjudication in achieving the remaining normative
goals is likely to be the same regardless of the nature of the adjudicator. Second, agency adjudication has withered as a mechanism
for making administrative policy in the face of sustained criticism
from the courts and the academy.199 The National Labor Relations
Board, for example, is one of the few remaining agencies that makes
policy largely through adjudication, and its process is roundly
criticized as a failure.200
1. Reasoned Decision Making and Expertise
Recall from the discussion in Part II.A.1 that sound patent policymaking depends on the ability of the decision maker to marshal
relevant information, to analyze that information, and to make
discretionary choices among policy options whose effects can be
specified only imprecisely. On balance, agency rulemaking is more
likely to reflect those characteristics than judicial adjudication.
Agencies are better able to access the full range of expertise
required to make sound patent policy judgments. Agencies may be
granted broad powers to conduct hearings, subpoena documents,
and engage in fact-finding.201 Rule-making procedures such as those
found in the APA are expressly designed to facilitate the transmission of relevant information to the agency from any and all parties.
199. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (5th ed. 2010);
Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 64950 & nn.4-6 (2008).
200. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law
Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J.
2013, 2016 & n.12 (2009).
201. The Federal Power Act, for example, grants the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission the authority to “investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which
it may find necessary or proper ... to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter
or in prescribing rules or regulations thereunder.” 16 U.S.C. § 825f(a). The Commission also
“is empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their
attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence,
memoranda, contracts, agreements, or other records which the Commission finds relevant or
material to the inquiry.” Id. § 825f(b).
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Indeed, in rulemaking subject to the provisions of section 553 of the
APA—which comprises most administrative rule-making proceedings—agencies are required to “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation.”202 The agency must then take those views into
account in promulgating its regulations.203 In the context of patent
policy, these procedures would allow a properly empowered agency
to collect technological and economic data that could inform sound
policymaking.
Courts, by contrast, are largely confined to the record developed
by the parties through the adversary process. Although parties in
patent litigation can and do present expert witnesses to develop
information for judges and juries to decide questions of validity and
infringement, the evidence developed in the course of adjudicating
a single patent or group of patents usually is too limited in scope to
assist in broader policymaking. That evidence is also prone to bias
in favor of whichever party presents it, resulting in an inevitable
“battle of experts.”204
There are limited other mechanisms for courts to improve their
access to information and expertise. For one thing, appellate courts
may consider amicus curiae briefs from almost any interested
party.205 As Colleen Chien describes, the Federal Circuit in particular has made liberal use of amicus briefs in important patent
cases.206 In particular, the Federal Circuit typically invites amicus
participation expressly in cases that it chooses to hear en banc, and
will on occasion grant argument time to counsel for amici, an
unusual practice among federal courts.207 But this approach presents several problems. Even though amicus briefs may present
202. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
203. See, e.g., City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The requirement
that agency action not be arbitrary or capricious includes a requirement that the agency ...
respond to ‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ public comments.” (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA,
988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993))).
204. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE
L.J. 1535, 1616-25 (1998) (criticizing use of competing expert testimony to elucidate scientific
facts); Rai, supra note 11, at 1099.
205. See SUP. CT. R. 37; FED. R. APP. P. 29.
206. See Chien, supra note 184, at 4-5.
207. See id. at 4 & n.15.
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information that extends beyond the confines of the record or that
may—particularly before the Supreme Court—suggest to the court
some of the broader implications of a particular case, the actual
decision is still confined to the questions of fact and law presented
in the litigation.208 In addition, a court does not have the power to
order its own fact-finding, so it remains dependent on the happenstance of the right amicus submitting a brief that contains the right
sort of information for making an informed policy choice. Finally,
there remains the question of institutional capacity to analyze the
information provided through amici.
Closely related to the problem of information gathering is the
challenge of bringing the right expertise to analyze and understand
that information. Sound patent policymaking requires analysis of
complicated economic and technological data.209 It requires decision
makers who are trained not only in the relevant technological arts,
but also in understanding the economic implications of various
innovative policy decisions. Administrative agencies exist primarily
for the purpose of bringing this kind of expertise to bear to solve
policy problems within the statutory authority delegated by
Congress.210 Indeed, agencies in the New Deal and Progressive Eras
were thought to bring needed expertise to government action.211
Some commentators dismiss the possibility that the PTO can play
a significant role in patent policymaking on the ground that the
Office as currently structured lacks the required expertise.212 That
is true so far as it goes. The PTO does not yet possess the relevant
expertise—it has only recently filled a newly created chief economist
position.213 The PTO is set up primarily to perform the tasks of
patent examination, which, as described above, are distinct from
policymaking.214 But it does not follow from these observations that
208. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 775-79 (2000) (describing “legal model” of
amicus participation, in which amicus briefs are useful legal inputs into standard judicial
decision-making process).
209. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
210. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (Greenwood Press 1974).
211. See id. at 21-22; Duffy, supra note 31, at 1091-94 (describing progressive
administrative philosophy).
212. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
213. See Rai, supra note 60, at 2054-55.
214. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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no agency properly constituted could make patent policy successfully. In Part III.A, I discuss changes to the PTO’s organizational
structure and mission that could enable it to take on a fuller role in
policy development.
It also is hard to conclude from the absence of economic expertise
in the current PTO that the policy-making function should instead
be located in the Federal Circuit or the district courts. In courts
—even those courts that are well informed by robust amicus
participation—the decision maker remains the judge rather than an
expert trained in the relevant fields. Expertise is always external.
This is so even with respect to specialized courts like the Federal
Circuit. Part of the motivation for the creation of the Federal Circuit
was to engage its judges frequently with patent law so that they
could develop expertise in the law and its application.215 And while
it is true that many of the Federal Circuit judges have scientific
backgrounds, they do not collectively have complete coverage of all
relevant technologies.216 Neither does a background in science necessarily prepare a judge for the economic analysis required for good
policymaking.
Finally, agencies are expressly authorized to weigh costs and
benefits—both quantitative and qualitative—and come to judgments
about competing notions of what is likely to be good for society. That
is, agencies are granted the authority to make discretionary
judgments based on broad standards laid out in congressional
statutes. For that very reason, their decisions are usually subject to
judicial review only for arbitrariness or caprice.217 The judicial
review provisions of the APA are designed to allow the agency to
choose between competing options; so long as the agency’s decision
is reasonable and supported, a court generally will not compel the
choice of an equally plausible alternative. Courts are not in the
habit of second-guessing the well-reasoned policy choices that
agencies may make.218
215. See Dreyfuss, supra note 48, at 74.
216. As Professor—now Federal Circuit Judge—Kimberly Moore has noted, “[i]t is a
common misconception that all the Federal Circuit judges were first engineers or scientists.”
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245 (2005).
217. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
218. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 40-44 (1983).
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There is good reason for that hesitation: courts not only have
difficulty gathering and processing economic and technological
information, but they also are institutionally disinclined to make
express policy judgments. The process of judicial decision making
relies on arguments from statutory language, precedent, and logic.
Every first-year law student learns the difference between arguments from precedent and “policy arguments.”219 Courts usually
eschew the latter. Indeed, courts are constrained by a variety of
decision-making rubrics that operate to ensure that judges do not
in fact simply exercise policy judgment. Reference to precedent, the
use of legal formalisms, textual analysis of statutes, and the like
are all mechanisms designed to rein in judges’ ability to act as
policymakers. When judges do step outside these constraints to
exercise policy judgment, they are criticized for doing so, sometimes
harshly.220 Norms of judicial decision making thus counsel against
naked exercises of policymaking. In patent cases in particular, the
Federal Circuit “rarely provides insight into the policy rationale for
its own decisions. Indeed, some of the judges have publicly suggested that it would be wrong to explain—or even to be motivated
by—policy.”221
This is not merely a rhetorical conceit that courts employ. Courts’
antipathy toward express policymaking is a serious intellectual
handicap. In cases like those arising under ambiguous provisions of
the Patent Act, the courts do in fact make policy. Their decisions
interpreting and applying the statutory criteria are necessarily
fraught with policy concerns, and constitute precedent on which
reasonable parties will rely in ordering their primary behavior. Yet
these policy decisions are not made honestly.222 They are not made
in the open. Rather than expressly weighing costs and benefits and
explaining their reasoning in terms of public policy, courts frequently resort to legal formalism. That analytic move, in turn, can
219. See Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1109, 1112-15 (2008) (describing types of legal arguments).
220. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
221. Dreyfuss, supra note 61, at 803 & n.70.
222. Cf. David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 940 (1965) (arguing that rulemaking prevents
decision makers from “hiding the ball” by making hard-to-discern rules through case-by-case
adjudication).
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lead to poor policy outcomes. Poor policy arising from legal formalism is especially commonplace in Federal Circuit patent cases.
Several commentators have bemoaned the Federal Circuit’s embrace of rule formalism.223 Under that decision-making rubric, the
Federal Circuit has adopted bright-line rules with respect to such
policy-inflected judgments as what constitutes patentable subject
matter and what evidence is probative of nonobviousness. As John
Thomas has observed,
[t]he drive to formalism may ... distance the patent law from
innovation policy. When deciding whether inventions from a
particular sphere of endeavor should be patented, for example,
the Federal Circuit does not query into that field’s pace of
innovation, need for interoperability, or industrial structure. The
court merely asks whether the innovation is minimally useful.224

Burk and Lemley nevertheless argue that judges can be more
sensitive to the “policy levers” built into the statute.225 They defend
their proposal against the criticism that it amounts to “judicial
activism” on the ground that courts paying attention to patent policy
are merely filling in the gaps in the patent statute that Congress
left open.226 The statute certainly does require gap-filling. But Burk
and Lemley’s defense of courts-as-gapfillers ignores the deeper
criticism that express policymaking is somewhat antithetical to
courts’ usual way of doing business. The concern is not with judicial
activism per se, but with a call for express policymaking by an
institution that is temperamentally unsuited to the task. The
distortions described in this Section make judicial reasoning less
attractive as a means for determining patent policy than the
expressly policy-based reasoning that an agency would be free to
employ.

223.
224.
225.
226.

See, e.g., Rai, supra note 11, at 1103-10; Thomas, supra note 125, at 774.
Thomas, supra note 125, at 774.
Id. at 107-08.
Id. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109.
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2. Clarity and Predictability
As described in Part II.A.2, certainty and clarity are particularly
important in patent policy. Case-by-case adjudication, however,
largely fails to produce clear and predictable policy.227 This is true
with respect to litigants’ initial selection of issues, a court’s initial
resolution of those issues, and the judiciary’s subsequent development of the law.
One problem with case-by-case adjudication is that any single
case may not present the full range of issues or policy problems that
ought to be decided together. Litigation is shaped not by the needs
of public policy, but by the strategies and arguments of the parties
to an individual case. This short-view approach means that lingering uncertainty might haunt patent rights in new technologies
for a significant period of time after the technologies are developed.
Take the example of gene patents.228 By the mid-1980s, patents for
human genetic material were proliferating and the biotechnology
industry was taking off.229 It should have been clear by that time
that several critical issues regarding these patents needed to be
resolved together, not the least of which was whether human genes
constituted patentable subject matter at all. Yet the myriad issues
surrounding gene patents were litigated piecemeal and are still
being litigated today. The result is a decision like the court’s in the
BRCA gene patents litigation, which, by calling into question the
validity of hundreds or thousands of issued patents, threatens
significant disruption to the system of property rights that has
emerged in biotechnology.230
A closely related problem arises in the selection of issues presented for litigation. Only a very small subset of issued patents are
ever litigated. The set of issues that come before judges is, therefore,
unlikely to be representative of the full range of policy problems
227. Several commentators have made this observation. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 199,
at § 6.8; Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking
and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163 (1986); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review:
The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts To Restructure the Electric Utility
Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 772; Shapiro, supra note 222, at 937-40.
228. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
229. See S.M. Thomas et al., Ownership of the Human Genome, 380 NATURE 387, 388
(1996).
230. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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that confront the patent system.231 Although a full evaluation of this
problem is beyond the scope of this Article, it also is likely that the
issues raised in litigation are systematically skewed. Litigated
patents, for example, tend to have more claims than other patents,
and tend to come disproportionately from certain industries—
mechanical, computer, and medical devices rather than chemicals
or semiconductors.232 Because of this skew in the sample, courts
making policy only through litigated patents inevitably will miss
issues that arise less commonly among the set of litigated patents.
Rulemaking has the potential to mitigate these problems by
allowing an agency to consider in a single proceeding all of the
issues relevant to a particular policy challenge.233 Rule-making
proceedings that can address multiple issues at one time can bring
some needed rationality to the policy-making process. An agency
with rule-making authority can take public input and consider a
range of issues respecting a class of patents, such as gene patents,
at an earlier stage in their development, thereby contributing to
more secure property rights.
Even when important policy issues are raised and resolved in
litigation, the policy rule may be insufficiently clear for parties to
build settled expectations. Policy certainly can be developed through
the common law. The gradual accretion of precedent yields legal
rules that can be articulated and defended.234 But judicial precedents are fact-bound. Reasoning from those precedents turns
primarily on analogies. Cases may be more or less distinguishable
from one another. Patent cases in particular tend to be highly factspecific. They involve challenges to the validity of a particular
patent and often turn on quite specific comparisons, say, between
the patent in issue and the relevant prior art. When policy is
231. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2004).
232. See id.
233. See Rossi, supra note 227, at 772 (“Lawmaking by adjudication requires litigation
before the agency in a series of highly fact-specific cases, whereas a single rule may settle
policy questions across multiple case-specific scenarios.”).
234. In this analysis, I use the word “rules” broadly. Although the challenge described here
intersects in part with the debate between rules and standards, see supra notes 123-25 and
accompanying text, my point here is that regardless of whether a legal principle is articulated
as a rule or a standard, it can be so articulated in either a prospective fashion, meant to be
generally applicable, or through the decision in a particular case that purports to bind only
the parties to that case.
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articulated wholly through judicial precedent, there remains
uncertainty in the process of discerning judicial rules, because a
rule’s applicability may depend on tenuous analogies across a long
line of cases. One advantage of agency rulemaking is the ability to
reduce that uncertainty by articulating the relevant rule or standard at a higher level of generality.235 Agency rulemaking operates
prospectively and it self-consciously seeks to articulate legal principles of general applicability. Judicial decisions by their terms bind
only the parties in the case; rules or standards governing the
conduct of nonparties are left to those parties’ judgment about the
interpretation and effect of precedent that has built up over the
years.
I do not mean to overstate the case in either direction. Courts can
and do articulate clear rules in the course of deciding cases. This is
especially true of the Federal Circuit in patent cases. That court
frequently uses the mechanism of rehearing en banc to clarify
important disputed issues that have arisen through the workaday
adjudication of patent cases.236 Similarly, agency rulemaking often
is far from pellucid. Administrative rules frequently require further
elaboration by the agency or by the courts.237 On balance, however,
agency rules are likely to be more certain sources of policy guidance
than judicial decisions.

235. The APA defines a “rule” as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 5 U.S.C. §
551(4) (2006). See also Rossi, supra note 227, at 770 (“Rules create law in the form of
statements which are binding on those persons or entities to whom they are addressed,
regardless of whether those persons or entities participated in the rule-making proceeding
which generated the rule. Rules bind the agency in future cases.”).
236. Most recently, for example, the Federal Circuit voted to rehear en banc the case of
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., which addressed the law of inequitable conduct.
In its order granting rehearing, the court sua sponte defined six separate issues that it sought
to resolve, some of which went beyond the scope of the initial briefing and decision in the case.
See Order, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 374 Fed. App’x 35 (2010).
237. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The
phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The
agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous
standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance or
memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in the
regulations. One guidance document may yield another and then another and so on. Several
words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and
more detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities.”).
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Once a rule—or a standard—is in place, the relevant decision
maker must be sufficiently flexible to change it when circumstances
change. This flexibility is often seen as a significant advantage for
courts. Courts have the ability to modulate their common law rules
organically with changing circumstances.238 If the next case presents
a new fact pattern or issue, the relevant legal principle can be
modified then and there. Agencies move much more slowly. Major
rulemakings often take months or years to complete. Once in place,
agency rules may be hard to change. A significant literature on the
“ossification” of rulemaking suggests that rules may become more
fixed than is optimal because the process of changing them is so
cumbersome.239
Yet agencies do have one advantage over courts: when an agency
seeks to change a previously promulgated rule, it must do so publicly.240 That is, the very process that leads to ossification also
ensures that rule changes are made with the same deliberation and
participation as the promulgation of the initial rule itself. When a
court changes the rules, on the other hand, the public is rarely on
notice and generally is not given the opportunity to participate.
It is difficult to say for certain whether the net benefits of judicial
flexibility are greater than the net benefits of administrative process
with its attendant prospective notice of a policy change. This factor,
therefore, may not favor one or another institution.
3. Transparency and Accountability
As described in Part II.A.3, sound patent policymaking requires
the participation of multiple stakeholders. At the same time, policy-

238. See Nard, supra note 11, at 56.
239. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). Duffy raises the opposite objection—“rulemaking
powers give executive agencies the power to change the rules when political forces change.”
Duffy, supra note 61, at 547 (emphasis in original). Although Duffy views the potential for
such change as “anathema to stable property rights,” id. at 548, it is difficult to see how this
objection applies more to agencies than to courts. Indeed, in related work, Duffy himself
criticizes the courts for changing the rules governing the patentability of business methods
no fewer than “three times in thirty years.” Duffy, supra note 125, at 612. The Supreme Court
has now changed those rules yet again. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
240. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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making institutions must remain independent and committed to
articulating policies that are in the public interest.
Agencies are generally much more open to participation than
courts. Indeed, agencies have institutional mechanisms designed
expressly to promote public participation. The notice-and-comment
rule-making procedure is one such mechanism.241 More and more,
agencies are turning to technology to improve communication and
interaction with entities that are interested in the outcomes of
regulation.242 Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s aggressive
solicitation of amicus briefs to inform its decision making,243 federal
courts simply are not institutionally designed to receive the range
of viewpoints that is necessary for optimal patent policy.
Yet agencies have a particular drawback: they often are subject
to “capture” by the entities they regulate.244 Repeated interactions
with the same body of law and the same group of regulated entities
may result in two kinds of institutional pathology. In the first, often
called “tunnel vision,” the agency becomes institutionally aligned
with the community it regulates simply through the ordinary dayto-day operation of regulations.245 Regulators encountering the same
set of issues in the same manner time after time lose the institutional ability to think creatively or to rethink settled rules.246 The
second is direct “capture” of the agency. “Agency capture” represents
an application of basic principles of public choice theory. In this
scenario, the regulated interests are concentrated and able to bring
significant resources to bear to ensure that the policies the regulator
enacts suit their interests.247 Countervailing forces, meanwhile, tend
to be diffuse and less able to exert significant influence.248 The result
241. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
242. See generally Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53
EMORY L.J. 433, 438 (2004).
243. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., J.J. Laffont & J. Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision Making: A
Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991); M.E. Levine & J.L. Forrence,
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 167 (1990); G. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
245. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1685 (1975).
246. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11-19 (1993).
247. See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 32 (1991).
248. Id.
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is that agency policy systemically tilts toward the interests of the
regulated entities.249 This dynamic may be reinforced by the
movement of personnel between the regulator and the regulated, as
often happens in industries that have concentrated interests before
the government.
Several commentators have objected to the expansion of the
PTO’s authority on the ground that it will be—or already is—
captured by patent holders.250 As it is currently structured, the PTO
interacts only with patent holders and patent applicants and their
lawyers. This one-sided interaction gives rise to legitimate fears at
least about tunnel vision.251 More directly, the PTO’s actions themselves suggest an orientation plainly in favor of patentees. The PTO
has in the past referred to applicants as “customers,” revealing an
institutional mindset that puts the needs of patent applicants
first.252 Although the PTO has stopped using that particular language, it quite clearly sees its mission as helping people to obtain
patents rather than ensuring that patents are granted in the public
interest.253 As I describe in Part III.A, this attitude reflects primarily the current role of the PTO, and the addition of substantive rulemaking authority would necessitate significant changes in the
PTO’s structure and function.
Nevertheless, the point remains that agencies are susceptible of
capture. Two potential factors, however, weigh against dismissing
agency rulemaking in the patent context solely because of concerns
over agency capture. First, there is reason to believe that the problem of agency capture will be less pronounced with respect to a rulemaking patent agency than with respect to other regulatory bodies
such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the FCC.
That is because the powerful interests in patent policy often fall on
opposite sides of major questions.254 With input coming from various
249. Id. at 35-44 (explaining modern interest group theory).
250. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 106-07.
251. See id. at 107 (“The PTO by design sees only one piece of the patent puzzle—the
question whether a patent should issue in the first place. It never sees infringement disputes,
or licenses, or has to allocate remedies.”).
252. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CORPORATE PLAN 23 (2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/index.htm.
253. See, e.g., PTO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 8 (describing the PTO’s mission as
“high quality and timely examination of patent and trademark applications”).
254. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Clarisa Long, The PTO and the
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equally powerful interests, the likelihood of any single interest
capturing the policy process is lower.255 It remains true that capture
is a possibility when the patent agency makes rules that will govern
a single industry or technology. But there is no reason to think that
the agency will be more or less susceptible to capture than any other
agency. There exists a well-developed set of tools that can mitigate
the threat of capture, including judicial review256 and public
participation.257
Second, recall that the institutional analysis here is comparative
in nature. Agency capture represents a significant objection to
rulemaking only if the judicial alternative is better. Judicial policymaking may in fact be subject to the same capture problems. The
Federal Circuit is the exclusive venue for hearing appeals in patent
cases.258 That specialization has led some to suggest that the
dynamics of industry capture common in agency settings applies
equally well to the Federal Circuit.259 Indeed, the Federal Circuit is
in many ways the primary steward of substantive patent law. Its
development of the law in recent years has, at times, been idiosyncratic, leading to a number of reversals in the Supreme Court.260 At
the very least, this is suggestive of the “tunnel vision” problem
described above.261
Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1992-93 (2009).
255. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme
Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 791 (2010) (“People in the research and
development business are both producers and users of technology. They do not want overly
protective law for the cases where they are accused of infringing, and they do not want overly
permissive law for the cases where they are the right holders.”); John M. Golden, The
Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 684-85 (2009) (describing heterogeneity of the patent bar
and arguing that divergent interests make capture of the relevant decision maker less likely).
256. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039, 1052 (1997).
257. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1709 (1975). For a good discussion of these and other mechanisms by
which agencies may avoid being captured, see generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
258. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(4)(A), 1333 (2006).
259. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 11, at 1111.
260. Id. at 1039.
261. See Long, supra note 254, at 1971 (describing “judicial self-aggrandizement” in which
“[j]udges in specialized courts may come to identify a little too closely with the areas of law
in which they specialize”); Rai, supra note 11, at 1110 (describing the basis for tunnel vision
at the Federal Circuit); supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
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More provocatively, the Federal Circuit may be subject to capture
just as much as an agency.262 It is well understood that courts and
litigation processes are susceptible to the influence of interest
groups.263 This influence may be particularly pronounced when it is
concentrated on a single court that bears outsized responsibility for
the development of a single area of the law.264 The practitioners who
come before the Federal Circuit to argue patent cases are drawn
almost exclusively from a patent bar that—regardless of whether a
lawyer is representing a plaintiff or defendant in a particular
case—benefits from strong and broad patent protection.265 Some
empirical work supports this conclusion: the Federal Circuit does in
many ways appear to be a pro-patent court.266 Although it is difficult
to say for certain that the Federal Circuit has been captured by the
patent bar, that possibility suggests at least that agency capture
may not be as strong an argument in favor of judicial policymaking
as one might think.
C. Evaluation
The choice between agencies and courts ultimately turns on the
nature of the decision to be made. As the patent system has
increased in complexity, the set of policy choices confronting
decision makers has come to look increasingly regulatory in
nature.267 In most other administrative systems in which the
government is charged with providing benefits to applicants, the

262. Rai, supra note 11, at 1110.
263. See Elhauge, supra note 247, at 67-68 (“[T]he same interest groups that have an
organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and agencies
generally also have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence the
courts.”).
264. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 163, at 17-18.
265. See Rai, supra note 11, at 1110 & n.340.
266. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that the Federal Circuit is significantly more
likely to find patents valid and infringed than did the regional appellate courts prior to 1982.
See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 10406 (2004). But the evidence of capture is mixed. Rai, for example, cites some evidence that the
Federal Circuit is biased toward patent holders, but finds it ultimately inconclusive. See Rai,
supra note 11, at 1110-14.
267. Cf. Ghosh, supra note 174 (discussing the applicability of theories of patent law and
proposed reforms within a regulatory theory context).
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rules that govern the award of those benefits are set by an agency
charged with interpreting and implementing Congress’s directives.
Only the awards themselves are subject to case-by-case adjudication.268
That model increasingly makes sense for the patent system as
well. Along each of the three relevant dimensions—reasoned decision making and expertise, clarity and predictability, and transparency and accountability—agencies offer significant advantages over
courts. Agencies are better equipped to evaluate technological and
economic data, to use that data in the service of cost-benefit analysis, and to choose among plausible alternative policies. Agency
rules are likely to be more conducive to certainty and predictability
in patent law. To be sure, there are some trade-offs: courts are likely
to be more flexible and less susceptible to capture by organized
interests. But neither of those concerns is significant enough to
outweigh the benefits of rulemaking.
It is important to note, however, that while rulemaking would
give an agency primary authority to make policy, it would not give
an agency exclusive authority to do so.269 The next Part explains how
courts still have a role to play even if it is secondary to the agency.
The courts’ comparative advantage in flexibility and independence—
to the extent it exists—can and should be brought to bear in the
context of judicial review of agency rules and later gap-filling of
regulations as necessary to resolve patent litigation. My proposal
therefore is not meant to suggest that the courts should stay out of
policymaking entirely. Instead, recognizing the benefits and limitations of courts and agencies as institutions, I seek only to allocate
to each the optimal type of decision making.

268. The Social Security Administration, for example, has long “rel[ied] on rulemaking to
resolve certain classes of issues ... that do not require case-by-case consideration.” Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983). Those classes of issues decided by rulemaking are then
applied in individual disability determinations, in which other, previously unresolved issues
also are addressed. Id. at 467-68.
269. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005).
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III. HOW RULEMAKING WILL CHANGE PATENT ADMINISTRATION
The introduction of an agency with substantive rule-making
authority would represent a marked shift in authority over patent
policy from the courts to an agency. Some commentators have
therefore concluded that implementing rulemaking within the
agency is practically or politically infeasible.270 Neither is true. As
a practical matter, it is true that significant changes to the PTO’s
capabilities, organization, and funding will be necessary. But none
of those changes are unfamiliar in modern administrative governance. As a political matter, legislation granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority can hardly be considered beyond the pale
when the agency itself has lobbied for such authority and Congress
has considered it.271 It is true that industry groups likely will be
opposed to any substantial expansion of regulatory authority.272 But
public opposition is not uniform,273 and legislation in the face of
organized opposition is hardly uncommon.
This Part briefly considers some of the changes to the current
institutional structure that would be required to accommodate a
shift in authority from the courts to an agency.
A. The PTO
Throughout this Article, I have been careful to talk about a rulemaking agency generally, rather than the PTO specifically. As it is
currently structured, the PTO lacks both the capabilities and
incentives to engage in sound policymaking.274 More particularly, it
lacks the personnel and infrastructure to make economic judgments

270. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 30, at 272.
271. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
272. As Clarisa Long points out, the amicus briefs in Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2009), in which the PTO argued before the Federal Circuit for an expansive interpretation of
its grant of procedural rule-making authority, “ran thirteen-to-two against the PTO.” See
Long, supra note 254, at 1992 n.133. No industry group supported expanded rule-making
authority. See id.
273. See Long, supra note 254, at 1992.
274. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 61, at 802; Rai, supra note 11, at 1132-33; Rai, supra
note 60, at 2055.
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concerning innovation policy.275 If the PTO is to promulgate substantive rules, it must add a policy-making apparatus. That
includes personnel dedicated to the policy-making function who
possess the right kinds of skills and training in both technology and
economics.
The policy-making function, moreover, must be organized and
incentivized to produce sound rules and standards in the public
interest. The current organizational structure of the patent examination function within the PTO is not likely to translate well to
that additional task. Right now, for example, patent examiners have
structural incentives to grant patents rather than deny them. These
incentives arise in part from the PTO’s system for evaluating
examiner performance, in which examiners are rewarded for taking
final action on applications,276 and in part from the structure of the
examination process, in which applicants can repeatedly avoid
denials.277 Put together, the easiest way for an examiner to secure
a favorable evaluation is to grant many patents.
The PTO as a whole also faces an institutional incentive that
favors patent grants over patent denials. This incentive arises from
the funding and fee structure of the agency. The PTO is currently
funded entirely through fees imposed on patent holders and patent
applicants.278 These fees fall into three categories: filing fees, which
are paid upon the filing of a patent application; issuance fees, which
are paid upon the grant and issuance of a patent; and maintenance
fees, which patent holders pay to renew their patents.279 The bulk
of the PTO’s revenue comes from issuance fees.280 On the theory that
bureaucratic entities seek to maximize their budgets (and, therefore, their flexibility),281 examiners are likely to be favorably disposed toward granting rather than denying patents.
275. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 11, at 1132-33.
276. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 156, at 1549-50; see also Michael J. Meurer,
Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 699-700 (2009) (calling for reform
of examiner incentives).
277. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
278. See Long, supra note 254, at 1984-85.
279. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
280. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: The Pressure To Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 26), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782988.
281. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
38-41 (1971).
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These factors raise a serious question whether the patent examination function and the patent policy-making function ought to be
carried out by the same agency. As Michael Abramowicz and John
Duffy note, “[p]lacing responsibility for both the regulatory function
and the production function on the same officials creates a risk that
the production task will influence the PTO in the conduct of its
regulatory responsibilities.”282 Nevertheless, there is likely to be
significant value in keeping the two functions housed in the same
agency. For one thing, patent policy cannot be carried out in the
abstract. The issues deserving of policy attention will surface first
through applications for patents, and the examiners will be the
front line in dealing with novel questions of patentability. For
another, there is significant expertise housed among the ranks of
patent examiners; that expertise can be of great use in formulating
patent policy.283
Setting aside for the moment the possibility of changes to the
incentive or funding structure for examination, the ideal organization of the newly constituted PTO may be to keep the examination
and policy-making functions housed within the same agency but
with (a) separate budgets and personnel policies on one hand, and
(b) clear channels of communication for policy development on the
other.
B. The Courts
The introduction of agency rules with the force of law will
significantly change the role of the courts in making patent policy.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council and its
progeny hold that where Congress has delegated interpretive responsibility to an agency, the courts generally will not interfere in
the agency’s exercise of that responsibility:284 “If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable,
Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction
of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the

282. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 156, at 1561-62.
283. See Wasserman, supra note 280 (manuscript at 34-36) (describing examiners’ roles in
formulating substantive patent law).
284. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
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court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”285 That is
because filling gaps left in statutory language “involves difficult
policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than
courts.”286 Patent policy choices fundamentally rest on interpretations of the Patent Act that—if made by an agency with substantive
rule-making authority—would qualify for Chevron deference.287
Similarly, agency rules that implement the statute but do not raise
significant interpretive dilemmas would be subject to deferential
review under the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard.288
Granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority would
therefore mark a profound shift in authority over patent law. It
would not, however, totally preclude a role for the courts. Although
the PTO would have primary responsibility for making patent
policy, the courts would continue to play an important role in
shaping patent law in at least two ways: First, courts would review
and interpret the fruits of the PTO’s rulemaking. Second, courts
would step in to fill the gaps of that rulemaking in the course of
deciding validity disputes.
1. Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking
Unless Congress chooses otherwise, an agency’s actions are
subject to judicial review under the APA.289 Many agencies’ rules are
reviewable upon petition for review in the courts of appeals.290 It
likely makes sense for the PTO’s new rules to be similarly reviewable; the rule-making function contemplated here is primarily legal,
and review of the PTO’s rules would not require the development of
a factual record in the district court. One interesting question that
arises is whether this review should take place in the Federal
Circuit or elsewhere. The rationale for the creation of the Federal
Circuit was largely to achieve a measure of national uniformity that
285. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 843 n.11).
286. Id.
287. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001) (holding that
interpretations promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking presumptively qualify
for deference).
288. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
289. Id. § 704; Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 2342.

1804

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1747

had been lacking in the patent system when different regional
circuits took different views of patent doctrine.291 The need for uniformity in judicial decision making is less pronounced when courts
are reviewing agency rules. Although substantive patent law
certainly plays a role in such review, courts’ discretion is cabined by
the doctrines of administrative law.292 Moreover, whereas the
application of administrative law principles varies slightly from
circuit to circuit, the differences are not so pronounced as to have
prompted the kinds of uniformity concerns that drove the creation
of the Federal Circuit.293
More broadly, it is worth noting that an agency with rule-making
authority would achieve a similar—if not greater—degree of uniformity in patent law by promulgating rules that are binding
nationwide than the Federal Circuit can in the existing arrangement. The addition of rulemaking therefore calls into question the
rationale for maintaining a centralized and specialized court of
patent appeals.294
2. Litigation over Patent Validity or Application Denials
The courts would continue to play an important role in interpreting patent law in the course of validity litigation, but that role
would be more limited than it is today. In some cases, for example,
litigants may raise arguments that are addressed directly by a PTO
rule. In these cases, the court would apply the rule without further
interpretation. Review of many agencies’ rules is governed in part
by the Hobbs Act, which provides that a petition for review filed in
a federal court of appeals is the exclusive mechanism for judicial
review.295 This statute has been interpreted to preclude collateral
challenges to validly promulgated rules in subsequent litigation.296
This arrangement has the benefit of allowing for judicial review of
a rule, and then holding that rule to be settled law immune from
291. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
292. But see Nard & Duffy, supra note 48, at 1666.
293. See id. at 1669.
294. Cf. id. at 1620, 1625 (arguing that optimal uniformity may involve appellate review
by more than one court).
295. 28 U.S.C. § 2342.
296. See, e.g., U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jennings, 304 F.3d 950, 958 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002);
GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 743 (4th Cir. 1999).
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further challenge once it is upheld. Application of the Hobbs Act to
patent rulemaking would provide needed stability and uniformity
in patent law.
The addition of settled agency rules to validity proceedings has
implications for a long-running debate in patent scholarship over
the statutory presumption of validity. Under current law, issued
patents are presumed valid.297 Some scholars have questioned
whether this presumption is warranted, or have proposed modifications to the presumption of validity based on the extent of the
examination to which patents are subjected.298 The addition of
agency rules would likely strengthen the presumption of validity for
those patents issued pursuant to such rules. This is because the
underlying principles of patentability have already been vetted by
the agency and, potentially, by a court on direct review. There is
little reason to second guess the issuance, or denial, of a patent
pursuant to these rules.
In other cases, a party might raise challenges to the validity of a
patent that implicate an ambiguity of the agency’s rule or that fall
outside the scope of the rule altogether. In those cases, the courts
will shape patent policy in the interstices of the agency’s rules: it
will be for the courts to decide in the first instance what the
appropriate legal principle ought to be. Note, however, that under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, agencies with interpretive
authority over the statutes they administer retain the authority to
make binding legal determinations about the meaning of ambiguous
terms, even in the face of contrary judicial precedent.299
This structure is likely to result in productive exchange between
the courts and the PTO. Novel issues of patentability will inevitably
surface first in litigation. Courts can utilize their comparative
297. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
298. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007).
299. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83
(2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion.... Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill,
displaces a conflicting agency construction.”); id. at 983 (“[W]hether Congress has delegated
to an agency the authority to interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the
judicial and administrative constructions occur.”).
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advantage in deciding these issues on a case-specific basis. When an
issue has become sufficiently important or has percolated in the
courts for sufficiently long, the agency can step in and rationalize
the legal principle through rulemaking. That rule in turn will be
subject to further review and interpretation again in the courts. In
this fashion, courts and agencies will engage in something of a
dialog with respect to novel issues of patentability.
CONCLUSION
The institutional structure of the patent system has been with us
for over 170 years. It has outlived its usefulness. In a world of
sharply differentiated technology and an extremely high volume of
patent activity, judicial development of the “policy levers” that
modulate the standards of patentability will not produce optimal
outcomes. Instead, this Article has made the case for granting the
PTO substantive rule-making authority. As should be clear, agencies are far from perfect. But the likely gains that would result from
bringing the patent system in line with the modern administrative
state are significant. Given the importance of innovation to economic growth and cultural well-being, it is critical that the institutions responsible for making innovation policy decisions be rationalized. Granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority is a good
first step.

